

Foreign Policy: Nixon Dissatisfied With S

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3
foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5 billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5 billion, experts say. The Defense Department spends more than 80 per cent of the total, or about \$4 billion, about \$2.5 billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence

and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's dissatisfaction, but they say that until now he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomerate of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israel cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another is a proposal of State William P. Rogers, now under consideration by Congress, to establish a Central Intelligence Agency in the White House. This would give the CIA greater independence from the various departments and agencies, and would give the CIA more power over the other intelligence agencies.

formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '234 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's dissatisfaction with the output and organization of the intelligence community stems from the President's tidy mental habits and pressing budget problems; part comes from the intellectual acuity of Mr. Kissinger, a counterintelligence sergeant in World War II and a specialist on Soviet strategy and on disarmament.

On the other hand, the Administration recognizes that it must share the blame for not having come to grips with intelligence problems until now.

The President is said to have had difficulty ascertaining precisely what all the Federal intelligence agencies do—and with how much money and manpower.

"Trying to draw up an organization chart is a nightmare," a senior aide remarked. "No one other intelligence chief I person seems to be in charge of the Federal bureaucracy, mus-

That's part of the problem," his product to *Cable*. Whoever winds up running net-level consumers and decisions. "He's been trying to be someone with the President's confidence." He has been painfully hard to stay on. "The intelligence units have trouble," remarked a former White House official with

their own problems in figuring out the White House's mode of operation. Recently an intelligence unit in the Pentagon was in the feeling that the CIA was a good deal of time and money, a focal point of intelligence effort in the administration. In this Administration, and what functions each member of Mr. Kissinger's 110-man cautious."

Staff was supposed to perform. His associates also fear his usefulness as an intelligence adviser. They could be jeopardized if he were to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Kissinger and Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the committee, are due to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 22 to give Mr. Kissinger's first testimony to Congress.

The 49 Committee

Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, U. S. Johnson

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Headed by President Nixon

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INTELLIGENCE
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and head of Central
Intelligence Agency

Atomic
Energy
Commission
Howard Brown
Asst. Gen. M.

Bureau of
Intelligence
Research
Director,
Ray S. Cline

Central
Intelligence
Agency
Lieut. Gen. R.E.
Cushman Jr.,
Deputy dir.

G-2 [Army
Intelligence] Office

U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: Six groups comprising intelligence directors or deputies shown on chart. The forty committee screen

about 1,200 intelligence officers and now it has 300. Its annual intelligence budget is \$3 million, or 0.25 per cent of spending on intelligence. Recently Mr. Rogers has directed Mr. Cline to take a more vigorous part at Intelligence Board meetings, asserting the department's "primacy" in foreign policy, and specifically in intelligence collection and evaluation.

Mr. Nixon is said to feel the need to settle the question of ultimate leadership but to be willing to wait until the study he ordered is completed.

Mr. Helms's control over intelligence activities is indirect and his powers are circumscribed. He is an adviser on intelligence, not on policy. He

points out the likely implications from policy acts but he does not recommend policies unless specifically asked to by the President.

Moreover, the director like

the Federal bureaucracy, must

be "self" his product to *Cable*.

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is the real mystery.

Rapid intelligence specialists insist to *Congress* can afford protection to policy interests.

The attack on North Korea in 1950, President Johnson was taken aback to learn that the *USS Pueblo*, an electronic intelligence ship carrying vital *code-breaking* devices, had been seized by North Korean gunboats. His immediate reaction was to order an attack on North Korea to free the ship.

CIA analysts in the White House situation room warned him that the North Koreans had 450 jets and 15 surface-to-air missile batteries. Later, it was reported that a North Korean broadcast just intercepted indicated that the *Pueblo* had seized 23 miles off the coast. With this information, Johnson decided to run the risk of a surprise strike on Asia.

His associates also fear his usefulness as an intelligence adviser. They could be jeopardized if he were to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Kissinger and Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the committee, are due to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 22 to give Mr. Kissinger's first testimony to Congress.

Egyptians to continue introducing missile batteries into the standstill area after the deadline, infuriating Israel threatening the cease-fire and embarrassing the White House. Administration embarrassed

Faulty coordination prior to the abortive Suez raid also embarrassed the Administration. There is evidence that the C.I.A., at Mr. Helms's direction, furnished the *Pentagon* with what information it needed on North Vietnam during planning in the early planning stages last summer. However, the *Pentagon* took over the planning.

What went wrong is still a mystery. As is the case with the *Pueblo*, rapid intelligence specialists insist to *Congress* can afford protection to policy interests.


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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1971

Classified With Size and Cost of Intelligence Sector



UNITY: Six groups comprising Intelligence Board are represented at its meetings by the forty committee screens (inset) on chart. The forty committee screens screen proposals for the President.

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Administration Embarrassed

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Before dawn on Jan. 23, 1968, President Johnson was awakened to learn that the U.S.S. Pueblo, an electronic intelligence ship carrying vital code-breaking devices, had been seized by North Korean gunboats. His immediate reaction was to order an attack on North Korea to free the ship.

C.I.A. analysts in the White House situation room warned him that the North Koreans had 450 jets and 15 surface-to-air missile batteries. They also reported that a North Korean broadcast just intercepted indicated that the Pueblo had been seized 23 miles off the coast.

With that information Mr. Johnson decided against the risk of a second war on the men in Laos, where President John F. Kennedy ordered it.

"In the missile age, the most dangerous enemy of the United

States is an informed President," Bromley Smith, a former White House aide, wrote not long ago.

A President, of course, may choose to use the intelligence resources at his command or not. Whatever he chooses, they are substantial.

The C.I.A. is the "secret" arm, created under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate all overseas intelligence activities and to winnow for the President intelligence from whatever source, affecting national security. As its leader, Mr. Helms is the senior intelligence adviser to the President and Congress.

The agency can conduct espionage anywhere outside the United States. It has no powers of arrest and interrogation but cooperates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Congress has endowed the agency to perform services of "common concern" to other branches of government as ordered by the National Security Council. That is its charter for "dirty tricks": flying U-2's over the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1960; ferrying agents in and out of enemy-held areas of Southeast Asia; organizing training and supplying \$50,000

to anti-Communist Meo Zai Lin in Laos, where President John F. Kennedy ordered it.

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Proposals for covert actions come from the White House, the State, Defense or Justice Department and from ambassadors and military commanders overseas. All must eventually be approved by a little-known White House panel whose designation is periodically switched for cover purposes.

Known at present as the Forty Committee, for the number of the memo constituting it, it consists of Mr. Helms, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, Mr. Kissinger and U. Alexis Johnson, and lofting or exploiting the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. If all agree on a proposal, it goes forward; if not the President decides.

On the other side the C.I.A. employs several thousand social and physical scientists to study the flood of information pouring in daily—half from open sources, a third from satellites and telemetry and 10 to 15 per cent from spies.

The other agencies, notably those at the Pentagon, have less developed evaluation facilities but far greater collection tools. The Pentagon is authorized to run its own agents abroad after clearance from the C.I.A. Mr. Helms is said to have little control over its activities.

The Administration has also been embarrassed by recent disclosures that Army intelligence, assigned by the Johnson Administration to spy on civilians during civil disturbances starting in the summer of 1967, virtually ran wild and by late 1969 had fed 18,000 names into its computers, dossiers and files.

Neither Mr. Helms nor the Intelligence Board had any connection with this domestic counterespionage. It was an example of overlarge staffs using excessive facilities under too little civilian control.

The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency has a staff of 3,000 and spends \$500-million yearly—as much as the C.I.A.—to collect and evaluate strategic intelligence.

It uses Air Force planes to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. Its National Security Agency at Fort Meade, near Baltimore, spends \$1-billion yearly and employs nearly 100,000 cryptanalysts and supporting staff to crack codes and eavesdrop on world communications. Its National Reconnaissance Office spends another \$1-billion yearly flying reconnaissance airplanes flying reconnaissance airplanes and lofting or exploiting the

satellites that scan the earth and return pictures of accuracy from space.

The results of the coming merger remain to be seen of Secretary Laird, who ordered General report to him instead Joint Chiefs of Staff, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert F. C. expected in time the Pentagon's intelligence machinery control and to sit Pentagon's main office at Mr. Helms meeting of the Board.

Many intelligence agencies need for the fact," tightening nation, making more responsive to modulation of foreign Some, citing successes since World War II, little change beyond and tampering."

Others feel that "house" reorganization distinct from an organization studded with political but substantive people, may and may strengthen Helms's guidance of intelligence community.

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Tomorrow: Congress the Administrati

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

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The Budget and Cost of Intelligence Setup



[Air
Intelligence]

res/Andrew Sabbelini Jan. 22, 1971
ended at its meetings by the
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the earth and photograph en-
emy terrain with incredible
accuracy from 130 miles up.

The results of the President's
coming management survey re-
main to be seen of course, but
Secretary Laird has already
ordered General Betancourt to
report to him instead of to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover,
an Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, Robert F. Froehlke, is
expected in time to take all
the Pentagon's massive intel-
ligence machinery under his
control and to sit in as the
Pentagon's main representa-
tive at Mr. Helms's weekly
meeting of the Intelligence
Board.

Many intelligence men con-
cede the need for "trimming
the fat," tightening up co-ordi-
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Whatever the outcome,
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
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Tomorrow: Congress and
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Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance

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Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontay prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted in U-2 photographs a sign of a Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos, Cuba, last September. His suspicions, based on the arrival of a mother ship, plus two in conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intense behind-the-scenes negotiation and the President's recent warning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed ships "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist talking with reporters, but interviews over several months with Federal officials who deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers and with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" it eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics on numbers, deployment and characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines and airpower for the talks with the Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off the ground at the talks without this extremely sophisticated in-

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White and his foreign-policy advisers —Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 52 and is

the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1963, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, his agency spends only about 10 per cent—\$500-million to \$600-million—of the annual intelligence budget. It employs about 150,000 Americans, plus a few thousand foreigners.

"When you have the authority but you don't control the resources," a senior Pentagon official explained, "you tend to walk very softly."

As for the State Department, which has constitutional responsibility even by the United States—over her territory.

Bearek of Bad Tidings

In addition the C.I.A. must sometimes report facts that the Administration is loath to hear—as happened last May when it told the White House, State Department and Pentagon that Vietnamese Communists had infiltrated more than 30,000 agents into the South Vietnamese Government, endangering its ability to last after an American troop withdrawal.

The slack use of the intelligence community's resources during the Middle East crisis last year illustrates a problem bothering the White House.

On June 19 Mr. Rogers urged a cease-fire; it was accepted by the Egyptians on July 22 and by the Israelis on Aug. 1. All parties agreed that it would take effect at midnight Israeli time on the seventh.

According to sources in and out of the intelligence community, Mr. Rogers and his principal deputy on the matter, Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, were unwilling to consider the possibility of violations. It was not until Aug. 10 or 11 that the first U-2's began flying from British bases on Cyprus. Even then there were problems. Weather delayed the first photographic

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intelligence arm gradually whittled away; in 1945 it had

The delays permitted the